[help!] 이 영어 문장들 번역 좀 도와주세요...

1. 

Surveying these developments in a telegram to the U.S. embassy in Paris on February 25, Acheson gave vent to bitter feelings of betrayal. “Over the past three years,” he declared, “[the] French have shown no impressively sincere intention or desire [to] make [the] concessions which seem necessary [to] solve [the] Indochina question.” The State department, Acheson added, could not tell if the Bao Dai "formula" had merit or amounted to just "another device to obtain delay," but unless proof was "added to offset [the] record of the past three years," the United states would remain far from inclined [to] give public approval [to] any arrangements with Bao Dai." With acid-dipped pen, the including Ambassador Caffery-that just two years earlier the french themselves had expressed serious reservations concerning “Bao Dai’s capacities and abilities.”

2.

Acheson hesitated before the precipice. On May 2, he instructed the American Consolate in Saigon to guard first against any “premature endorsement or de fecto recognition” of the new regime and, second, against any impression that the United States might oppose France’s Bao Dai formula.

3.

On May 10, 1949, Acheson reluctantly set aside his reservations and enunciated conditional U.S. support for Bao Dai solution, In a telegram to Abbott, he began by confirming that he wanted the Bao Dai “experiment” to succeed, and then, in words clearly borrowed from Caffery and Achilles, he added, “Since [there] appears [to] be no other alternative to establishing [a] Commie pattern Vietnam, [the] Department considers no efforts should be spared by France, other Western powers, and non-Commie Asian nations to assure {that the} experiments [has] the best chance [of] success.”

4.

The European specialists kicked off the debate by proclaiming that there was “no chance whatsoever of the French making any concessions” beyond those contained in their March 8, 1949, agreements with Bao Dai. This, of course, effectively precluded putting heavier presure on France, as espoused by the Asian specialists. Ahter a brief debate, the two sides reached a consensus that “the U.S. should not put itself in a forward position in the Indochina problem since there appeared to be nothing we could do to alter the very discouraging prospects, and that we should endeavor to ‘collectivize’ our approach tp the situation.”  

5.

Kennan-according to his deputy, Paul Nitze-sometimes irritated Acheson by insisting that each of his PPS reports be treated “as a chalice.” But the report on Southeast Asia marked as “broad guidance to Departmental thinking on the subject and as a strategic concept from which tactical planning by operational offices flow.” Although thois eliminated the need for formal NSC approval, it severely undermined the authority of the PPS’s recommendations.

번역을 재검토해서 다시 내야 해서 하루종일 대조하고 재번역하고 윤문도 하는데, 이 다섯 부분은 제 머리로는 도저히 매끄럽게 번역이 안 되네요.

영어 나름대로 준비하는데도 이렇게 막히니 원...